


Position Paper of the Working Group on Youth and Foreign Climate Policy



October 2024



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As the Federal Foreign Office's independent Youth Committee on Foreign Climate Policy, we aim not only to support the UNFCCC processes, but also to keep an eye on Germany's entire foreign climate policy. Against the backdrop of the current negotiations on the EU position for COP29, we are focusing in this paper on the upcoming climate conference in Baku. Our position paper does not constitute the position of the German delegation. Even though they are not being negotiated directly, it is important for us to also draw attention to the cross-cutting issues of human rights, climate security, feminist foreign policy, biodiversity and global health, which are also relevant in the context of the COP.

The vision of our recommendations is a 1.5-degree-compliant, climate-just world in which the well-being of all living beings is protected and the planetary boundaries are not exceeded. We therefore call on the German government not to allow any regression in either domestic or foreign policy and instead to advocate for an ambitious, fair climate policy. We explicitly address the responsible negotiators and political decision-makers (in Germany) and look forward to in-depth discussions.

We address the following demands expressly to the responsible negotiators and political decision-makers in Germany.



Quantitative Elements

We support the German government's commitment to finding new sources to meet climate finance needs. As outlined in the [first report of the Standing Committee on Finance](#) to determine the financing needs of so-called developing countries to implement the Paris Agreement, the climate financing needs of the countries of the so-called Global South amount to around 6 trillion US dollars by 2030. The amount of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) must reflect the realistic needs for climate finance.

The historically highest emitters, including Germany, bear the main responsibility for today's climate crisis and its consequences. It is important that Germany makes its [fair contribution](#) to international climate financing and does not make it contingent on others. At the same time, we support encouraging other historical main polluter states to make fair contributions and make up for shortfalls. Failures or the amount of contributions made by others must not lead to a country avoiding its own responsibility, as stipulated by the Federal Constitutional Court in its [ruling](#) on the 2021 Climate Protection Act. An expansion of the donor base must not be a prerequisite for agreeing a target amount in line with requirements.

Qualitative Elements

The NCQG must be consistent with the UNFCCC principles of justice and historical responsibility and uphold the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC).

Human rights and equality of all genders must be at the heart of the NCQG, i.e. the rights of FLINTA* (women, lesbians, intersex, non-binary, transgender and agender persons) and LGBTIQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, asexual), workers, Indigenous Peoples, children and young people and people with disabilities must be taken into account and forms of discrimination must be eliminated.

The NCQG must not lead to further indebtedness in countries of the so-called Global South, but must counteract it.

Transparency and Accountability

The provision of climate finance must be measured continuously and the target renewed in good time. To date, Germany has provided transparent and comprehensible information on how much climate finance it provides in the form of grants and low-interest loans. Binding and standardized measurement methods would help other donors to follow this best practice. Loans at market conditions should not be counted as public climate finance and a distinction should be made between grants and low-interest loans. A breakdown by recipient country and sector can help to identify and close financing gaps.

Structure and Sub-Goals

The NCQG must provide new, additional and predictable funding for so-called developing countries and ensure direct access for marginalized groups. To this end, the focus should be on the provision of public funds, especially grants and very low-interest loans. Further measures to mobilize and provide non-public funding can also be adopted as a strong political signal as part of a COP29 cover decision.

A needs-based distribution of funds between mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage should be decided in sub-goals of the NCQG. This will ensure the predictability and achievement of the overall goal and also increase the commitment towards countries that have not yet made their fair contribution.

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5. Mobilization of Public Funds

- a. In line with the CBDR-RC principle, funds must be mobilized for adequate climate financing. In order for the main emitters in particular to meet their responsibilities (»polluter pays principle«), changes need to be made to the tax system: we support the introduction of a [global tax on the assets of the super-rich](#), the fossil fuel industry and the arms industry. The German government, and the Ministry of Finance in particular, should support Brazil's initiative and actively promote it at the upcoming G20 meetings. The German household debt cap (»Schuldenbremse«) must be reformed and abolished in the long term so that vital and systemically relevant investments in mitigation, adaptation and resilient infrastructure are assured. At the same time, climate-damaging subsidies such as on kerosene, company cars and diesel should be abolished and a possible reallocation of military spending should be discussed.

6. Reform of the international financial system and tax justice

- a. Sustainable and effective climate finance requires a structural reform of the global financial architecture. It is much more difficult for poor countries of the so-called Global South to invest in mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development due to unequal trade relations, credit conditions and debt regulations. As a result, billions of dollars more are lost to the Global South every year through interest payments and debt repayments alone than is received through so-called development cooperation.
- b. International organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) must be reformed in a way that allows recipient countries to make their needs known effectively in fair and transparent co-determination and decision-making processes and to gain access to affordable financing.
- c. In line with reform proposals that are being discussed as part of the Bridgetown Initiative, amongst others, Germany should advocate a reallocation of IMF special drawing rights. Germany must push for rules on effective and fair debt relief and debt restructuring as well as a reform of the rating agencies, which systematically make access to funding more difficult for vulnerable countries due to rating bias. This also includes Germany advocating for the EU to unanimously support the adoption of the »Terms of Reference for a Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation« at the upcoming UN General Assembly and to actively promote subsequent negotiations.



Finance

Financing for the Loss and Damage (L&D) Fund should primarily come from industrialized countries and the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, as they have historically and currently contributed the most to global warming. This funding must be swift, predictable, needs-based, new and additional, and grant-based so as not to exacerbate the climate debt of affected countries.

We call for the integration of a third pillar for »loss and damage« in the climate finance negotiations, which prioritizes both the economic and non-economic needs of vulnerable countries. This demand should be anchored in the new climate finance goal (NCQG). The financing of loss and damage should be based on structural financing mechanisms and not on voluntary levies.

Operationalization

Particularly vulnerable communities, such as SIDS (Small Island Developing States) and LDCs (Least Developed Countries), should be prioritized in the distribution of funds. Accessibility for civil society, especially vulnerable groups, must also be ensured, with particular attention to people affected by discrimination, including FLINTA*, LGBTIQA+, Indigenous Peoples, people with disabilities and children and youth.

The next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) submissions should include measures that are taken to address the economic and non-economic impacts of L&D. In addition, transparency in L&D negotiations is essential.

Capacities, research, transparency

Technical cooperation is needed to support vulnerable countries in building capacity to analyze, manage and report on L&D. Research and data collection should be improved to better understand the climate impacts and effectiveness of L&D measures and to develop informed policies and practices.

Inclusion

L&D should pursue an intersectional approach in the implementation of Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) and ensure civil society participation in the negotiation process and in the governance of the fund. The steering committees of the fund must include marginalized and affected groups at all levels.

Mainstreaming of Loss and Damage

It must be ensured that L&D is not treated as a separate issue, but is anchored in all processes and at all levels of international (climate) policy, including disaster risk reduction (DRR), health, migration, culture and sustainable development.

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
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


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Mitigation

1. Pioneering role in the energy transition

- a. Globally, the share of renewable energies in the energy mix is increasing, but the use of fossil fuels is not yet decreasing. While the peak in global emissions is still imminent, irreversible climatic tipping points could soon be reached. Germany is perceived internationally as a pioneer in the expansion of renewable energies and can support other countries in a fair energy transition through climate and energy partnerships. Further support for fossil fuel projects at home and abroad, on the other hand, undermines Germany's pioneering role and delays the global peak. By joining the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA) and endorsing the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty initiative, Germany can send a strong international signal for the decisive end of the fossil age and raise awareness of the acute threat posed by the climate crisis. Instead of accelerating the climate crisis by clinging to fossil fuels, Germany can actively shape the path out of coal, oil and gas and into a just, fossil-free future.
- b. Alongside the pledge to end fossil fuel subsidies, we recommend reviewing Germany's more than 100 bilateral investment protection agreements to see how they hinder emission reductions. Agreements that are harmful to the climate should be terminated or renegotiated in such a way that they promote climate protection and private companies can no longer sue states in arbitration courts.

2. Commitment to ambitious NDCs

Clearly defined targets for a just phase-out of fossil fuels and expansion of renewable energies

- a. The Global Stocktake (GST) has shown the extent of the gap towards 1.5 degrees. The next NDCs are a crucial last chance to get on a 1.5 degree pathway and minimize the destruction of livelihoods of current and future generations. For this to succeed, the next NDCs must go beyond the GST agreements and promote the just, fastest possible global phase-out of all fossil fuels. Germany should advocate for a 1.5 degree-compliant EU NDC based on the latest scientific findings, which should be submitted before February 2025.
- b. The EU is currently at risk of missing its 2030 target of a 55% reduction in emissions. The EU should not only adopt an ambitious target for 2035, which envisages net zero emissions by 2040 at the latest, but also tighten the 2030 target to at least -65% (gross) compared to 1990.
- c. The EU NDC should set concrete targets for the expansion of renewable energy within the EU and globally. It should send a strong signal to support vulnerable countries in implementing the NDC and break down the EU's contribution to the global tripling of renewable energies.
- d. Simultaneously, the EU NDC must include a clear timeline for phasing out all fossil fuels and fossil fuel subsidies. All greenhouse gases (incl. methane), sectors (incl. agriculture) and Scope 1 to 3 emissions must be taken into account. The forecast of rising energy demand, which goes hand in hand with the decarbonization of the economy through the electrification of transport and heating, cannot serve as justification for further extending the operational lifespan of fossil fuels.
- e. Germany and the EU should advocate globally applicable standards for national net zero targets that include a final target before 2050 as well as interim targets with concrete implementation plans.



Anchoring the transformation of the economic system and sufficiency targets in the NDC

A strategy based solely on so-called green growth and increased efficiency will not achieve the 1.5 degree target. It is important to identify the link between economic growth and ecological destruction and to redefine our understanding of prosperity in such a way that it includes socio-economic and ecological resilience and also takes into account qualitative factors such as quality of life and human rights. This allows for a transformation towards an economy that operates within planetary boundaries, prioritizes social and ecological welfare over monetary profit and also relies on the principle of sufficiency. In the NDC process and beyond, the German government can initiate a forward-looking global development that also serves the domestic political climate in the long term by offering effective solutions to the increasing physical and mental overload, the exploding cost of living, growing inequality and the neglect of public space. Ultimately, this also counteracts a perfidious but widespread political discourse that blames the growing social dissatisfaction on vulnerable minorities and refugees in particular.

f.

No loopholes for delayed emission reductions using negative emission technologies, geoengineering and offsetting

We call on the German delegation to exclude carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies from the COP positions on the continued operation of fossil fuels. All »dangerous distractions« that delay the energy transition and the just transformation in other sectors must be excluded.

g.

The energy transition must be viewed in a decentralized manner. Centralized suppliers such as nuclear energy jeopardize a decentralized energy supply and are not sustainable, especially as long as final storage has not been resolved. Germany should campaign for a global nuclear phase-out.

h.

Germany should also advocate a global non-use agreement for the use of solar geoengineering, as its consequences cannot be assessed. Further geoengineering hype must not distract from the real discussions at the COP and beyond.

i.

As also described in the chapter on Article 6, emissions may not be »offset« either within the EU or with third countries.


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Countries that nevertheless rely partially on CCS or other technologies must be encouraged to make the risks in terms of human rights, climate protection impact, financing and implementation fully transparent and to take appropriate (preventive) measures. In addition, the NDC must clearly identify which emissions are to be reduced by which measures - through genuine climate protection or technological measures.

k.

Savings from the Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector must not be included. Countries that include them should be required to critically examine the feasibility, risks and financing.

l.



Climate justice in focus

- m. In addition to mitigation, climate adaptation plans must be improved and financial support from the historical main polluter states for adaptation and dealing with Loss and Damage must be massively increased.
- n. With climate justice as a goal, NDCs must contribute to reducing global injustices and to development oriented towards the common good. Human rights, in particular the rights of marginalized groups, a gender focus and the preservation of biodiversity should serve as the foundation of the new NDCs.
- o. NDCs can only be successfully implemented if they are supported by society as a whole. An inclusive and transparent NDC process is required that includes a wide range of perspectives, especially from youth. This [checklist](#) developed by UNEP offers a comprehensive guide for a youth-friendly NDC process.

3. Mitigation Work Program (MWP)

- a. The MWP must be designed to meet demand in order to achieve reductions worldwide and especially in the main polluter countries.
- b. In order to regain public trust, which is essential for progress in the MWP, strong NDCs and the implementation of previous decisions by countries such as Germany are necessary, such as the end of fossil subsidies and new fossil infrastructure.
- c. The MWP must include Just Transition measures and compliance with them in main polluter countries with a view to mechanisms such as the Supply Chain Act.
- d. The necessary emission reductions in all countries are not possible without needs-based financing from the historical emitters. In particular, money must be diverted away from fossil fuels and towards climate-friendly projects. The necessity can be formulated in the MWP and implemented in the NCQG.



Overarching

Fundamentally, we must say that the current direction of the debates on Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8 jeopardizes genuine climate protection, which the Parties agreed to in the Paris Agreement. In particular, the market-based solutions of 6.2 and 6.4 obscure the market-based causes of the climate crisis and lead to delayed action through calculation tricks, as previous carbon markets have already shown. In some cases, they even lead to negative consequences for the climate, the local population, biodiversity and food security. National climate protection measures should therefore always be preferred to offsetting. For us, »Real Zero« rather than »Net Zero«!

We support Germany's demand for integrity. For us, this also means that Article 6 may only enter into force subject to very strict regulations. For real climate protection, these regulations must guarantee the rights of local populations, include human rights standards and prevent negative impacts on biodiversity and food production in addition to the technical standards for a real transfer.

Emission certificates in carbon markets may not be recognized as climate financing for the NCQG.

Offsetting emissions through carbon markets in the form of a baseline-and-credit system must not be permitted either within the EU or with third countries. The EU should also ban the offsetting of certificates from baseline-and-credit systems in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) again. Our specific recommendations in the event of operationalization are:

Article 6.2

The technical and social requirements that are eligible for an ITMO (Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes) should correspond to those of the mechanism in Art. 6.4.

As long as no regulations have been defined, bilateral ITMOs should be avoided because transparency cannot be guaranteed.

The transfers should be authorized by the UNFCCC. Authorization cannot take place via companies, as was the case in the past with the *Gold Standard*, for example.

Only countries that have achieved net zero should sell ITMOs. Otherwise, there is a risk that this will bring additional added value for the climate.

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3. Article 6.4

- a. The regulations for 6.4. must contain strict and transparent rules to avoid double counting.
- b. To ensure the integrity of the certificates, they should only be issued for long-term greenhouse gas removals (not abatements).
- c. It is essential that the additionality of the projects under the mechanism is ensured.
- d. The supervisory body should make its decisions transparent and involve observers in order to prevent greenwashing and human rights violations at an early stage.
- e. An independent complaints mechanism should be set up to enable human rights violations and overestimated certificates to be reported. It must be clarified who bears responsibility in the event of such an incident.

4. Article 6.8

- a. This article is important as it stipulates that states also cooperate on a non-market basis. However, this cooperation must go beyond greenhouse gas pricing, levies and incentives. The evaluation of cooperation should therefore not be purely financial.
- b. The opportunity of this article is to form the basis for fair, solidary, un-bureaucratic technology transfer, support for existing initiatives and capacity building.
- c. Non-market-based solutions include granting land rights to Indigenous Peoples and local communities, funding existing initiatives for forest conservation, protection and restoration, and holistically integrating nature conservation, climate change mitigation and adaptation without assigning a monetary value to them. Problematic impacts can only be prevented without a market-based approach.
- d. In order to achieve the best possible results, a bottom-up approach should also be adopted and non-state actors should be given an important role.
- e. We feel that the EU's enthusiasm for Articles 6.2 and 6.4 is lacking in Article 6.8. During the COP in Baku, the focus should be on the regulations and the implementation of 6.8.

Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)

The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) must strengthen the adaptive capacity and resilience of all countries for sustainable development and reduce the vulnerability of those most affected. COP29 offers a crucial opportunity to make adaptation a priority and provide the necessary resources.

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Finance

Closing the financing gap is crucial to achieving the adaptation goals. Financing for adaptation must be doubled by 2025 and made available to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF) so that they can support governments and civil society as effectively and quickly as possible. This funding should be new, additional and grant-based to avoid indebtedness of the countries concerned. It is important that financial support is targeted to vulnerable groups such as Indigenous Peoples, people with disabilities, women and children to meet their specific adaptation needs.

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Support for NAPs

National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) are crucial tools, and COP29 should enhance financial and technical support for their development and implementation. The GCF should play a supportive role in the formulation and execution of NAPs for vulnerable countries. Nature-based solutions and indigenous knowledge should be prioritized within the framework of ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA). The principles of disaster risk reduction (DRR) must also be considered to prevent further losses and damages. The principles of locally-led adaptation should be applied at all levels.

3.
a.

Resilience through sectoral discussions

Resilience to climate change must be enhanced through sectoral discussions, as outlined in the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience. At COP29, delegations should be given space for sectoral discussions on water, agriculture, health, biodiversity, and infrastructure/settlements. Additionally, topics such as (climate-induced) migration, children and youth, and gender should be considered. Overall, climate adaptation must play a central role as an integral part of sustainable development at all levels.

4.
a.



- a. Only by mitigating the climate crisis can global injustices be reduced. However, we often find that decision-makers, under the guise of supposed social justice, slow down urgently needed climate protection measures. A just transition must not block the structural transformation of our society, economy, and politics, but must enable it. Burdens that may arise during this transition must be compensated (for example, in Germany through measures like so-called climate dividends (Klimageld)).
- b. To accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels as quickly as possible, we need just transitions that encompass procedural and intergenerational justice. Just transitions must be designed as bottom-up processes, creating space for restorative justice and climate justice within a holistic approach. In our understanding, a just transition must ensure comprehensive social protection for workers during the decarbonization of industries, while simultaneously addressing the systematic transformation of global economic and financial relations characterized by dependence and social as well as ecological exploitation.
- c. Young people must take the lead in processes that affect their current and future realities, within the context of a whole-of-society approach.
- d. Special emphasis must be placed on education and the qualification of young people to empower them as active agents of change and provide long-term future perspectives.
- e. Germany can take on a leading international role by placing a stronger focus on (local) capacity building, technology transfer, and equal-partner experience-sharing.
- f. Limiting ourselves to dialogues at the UN level cannot be our goal. What is needed are concrete measures and an action plan for implementing just transitions, which address injustices in climate financing, such as the high debt traps for so-called developing countries.
- g. Subsidies for fossil fuels must be completely abolished, as they are diametrically opposed to a just transition.



Gender (Lima Work Programme on Gender and Gender Action Plan)

Despite the final review of the implementation of the enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) and the negotiations on the Gender Action Plan (GAP) at COP29, we are currently observing a lack of political leadership and attention—particularly from the presidency—on this issue. We urge the German delegation to take a political lead in advancing the negotiations and ensuring no setbacks occur. Germany and the EU should advocate for a meeting of the gender negotiators before COP29 to push the negotiations forward in Baku.

a.

For the next Work Programme on Gender, we are calling for a 10-year commitment with a five-year action plan, effective participation of marginalized groups, support for actions at both national and multilateral levels, clear indicators for measurable progress, a potential technical committee to support implementation, and the provision of adequate gender-responsive financing for the operationalization of the LWPG and its GAP.

b.

In addition, the LWPG and GAP must explicitly address intersecting identities (e.g. race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, gender identity, education, disability, indigeneity) in relation to climate impacts and action, and address forms of multiple discrimination.

c.

We call on the German government to develop its own National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change based on the GAP and to establish a National Gender and Climate Change Focal Point.

d.




Human rights, climate security, feminist foreign climate policy, and participation



1. Human rights

- a. In Azerbaijan, human rights such as freedom of expression and assembly are particularly restricted for journalists and activists. This situation must neither be accepted nor ignored in the context of COP29 being held in Baku. We call on the German delegation to increase pressure on the organizers to immediately release unjustly imprisoned political activists and journalists. Human rights violations should be addressed before, during (for example, through events in the German Pavilion), and after the COP. Without human rights, there can be no climate justice.
- b. The delegation should advocate for the inclusion of human rights in the host country agreement, ensuring that respect for human rights and the ability of civil society to participate freely and safely in the conference are fundamental prerequisites for holding COP. The German government should also work to ensure that the host country agreement with Azerbaijan, as well as with all future host countries, is published and upheld.
- c. The impacts of the global climate crisis are directly linked to the violation of human rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and security for current and future generations. Therefore, Germany is materially and morally obligated to pursue consistent environmental and climate protection, as reaffirmed by Germany's recognition of the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment in UN General Assembly Resolution 76/300 and the Federal Constitutional Court's climate protection ruling in 2021. Thus, human rights must be at the center of negotiations and efforts for a just transition, adequate adaptation measures, and effective financing.
- d. The German government should advocate, in line with the Escazú Agreement, for the protection of the rights of environmental activists to be enshrined in the Aarhus Convention. Both the fossil fuel industry and the renewable energy sector, whose interests are often enforced by private security services, must be held accountable when projects lead to extractivism, land grabbing, displacement, and other human rights violations. To underscore Germany's commitment to protecting environmental defenders, measures must also be taken to counter the increasing criminalization of activists in Germany.

2. Climate Security

- a. The climate crisis is increasingly portrayed as a »threat,« which attempts to justify military and militarized responses as a legitimate »solution,« leading, among other things, to increased military spending. We reject the securitization of the climate crisis and demand that the German government focus on human security aspects, such as economic, health, social, political, and environmental security.
 - b. A transparent redistribution of military spending in favor of climate financing is necessary as a step toward climate justice. The German government should advocate for the development of strategies to reduce global military expenditures, which, according to SIPRI, reached \$2.4 trillion in 2023 and correlate with military emissions of approximately 5.5% of global emissions. A significant portion of these funds should be redirected to initiatives that promote feminist and indigenous solutions for the climate crisis and ecological sustainability.
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Feminist Foreign Policy

The climate crisis exacerbates existing gender inequalities and disproportionately affects FLINTA*, LGBTQIA+, and other marginalized groups, especially in conflict contexts. Therefore, we demand conflict-sensitive and gender-responsive climate financing for these contexts, as well as the involvement of marginalized groups in conflict resolution processes and climate projects.

The protection of (FLINTA* and LGBTQIA+) climate justice activists, environmental defenders, and indigenous communities must be actively addressed in the next German National Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security, and implemented through the development of protective mechanisms.

Participation of Civil Society

The perspectives of civil society actors, particularly MAPA (Most Affected People and Areas), must be more strongly integrated into political decision-making processes; their participation must go beyond tokenism. Additionally, proposals from civil society on topics and issues for Technical Expert Dialogues and workshops should be included.


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
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


Health and Climate Change

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- a. The climate crisis must be recognized as the health crisis and threat to human well-being that it is. The German delegation must advocate for greater consideration of this issue in international climate negotiations using an intersectional approach, in close collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Health (BMG). This also includes calling for greater presence and involvement of the WHO, NGOs, and experts in international climate negotiations.
 - b. The documented and evident impacts on mental health must be further researched and addressed through international climate negotiations, as conventional individual therapy measures are insufficient. The solution to these types of psychological stressors lies in addressing their root causes.
 - c. The interplay between rising heat and air pollution leads to further health risks. Fine particulate matter, nitrogen dioxide, and ozone pose the greatest environmental health risks in Europe. The German delegation must advocate for nature-based climate adaptation and mitigation measures that address both pollution and climate change simultaneously to minimize health risks.
 - d. Neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) pose a devastating human, social, and economic burden for over a billion people worldwide. Both their geographic spread and incidence are linked to climate change. NTDs predominantly occur in tropical and subtropical regions and among the most vulnerable, often marginalized populations. However, the majority of existing research has focused on the Global North. Germany must advocate for increased research focused on the most affected groups, as well as for interventions to contain and prevent NTDs.

Biodiversity

- a. Climate protection and adaptation cannot be addressed in isolation from other issues of environmental protection, biodiversity, and pollution. Germany must advocate for the integration and advancement of these aspects together.
 - b. Intact ecosystems and biodiversity are essential for human well-being, food security, climate protection, and climate adaptation. The German government must advocate for the implementation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and ensure that countries develop and implement ambitious targets for biodiversity conservation.
 - c. The European Green Deal must not lose significance with the new EU Commission but should be implemented with ambitious measures. This includes promoting a circular, restorative, and environmentally sound bioeconomy, as well as enhancing climate adaptation, particularly through nature-based solutions, water resilience, and green-blue initiatives in urban areas to address the risks of climate change.
 - d. The German government must advocate for a significant increase in financial resources for biodiversity protection at the international level, particularly to support so-called developing and emerging countries.
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We are 15 young people with different perspectives - representatives of youth associations, clubs and movements - who have been working together as the Working Group on Youth and Climate Foreign Policy since May 2024. With our different perspectives, we develop positions and recommendations for action on climate foreign policy that affect all of us (including you) as young people. We represent them at climate conferences, in contact with the Federal Foreign Office and other ministries as well as in discussions with representatives from politics and civil society. Our aim is to pass on our knowledge and experience from our involvement in the working group to the wider youth community and your input into climate policy.

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